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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-1306
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UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. GUY W.
OLANO, Jr., and RAYMOND M. GRAY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[April 26, 1993]

  Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The question in this case is whether the presence of
alternate jurors during jury deliberations was a -plain
error- that the Court of Appeals was authorized to correct
under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
                            I
  Each of the respondents, Guy W. Olano, Jr., and Ray-
mond M. Gray, served on the board of directors of a
savings and loan association.  In 1986, the two were
indicted in the Western District of Washington on multiple
federal charges for their participation in an elaborate loan
-kickback- scheme.  Their joint jury trial with five other
codefendants commenced in March, 1987.  All of the
parties agreed that fourteen jurors would be selected to
hear the case, and that the two alternates would be
identified before deliberations began.
  On May 26, shortly before the end of the 3-month trial,
the District Court suggested to the defendants that the
two alternate jurors, soon to be identified, might be
allowed to attend deliberations along with the regular
jurors:
-. . . I'd just like you to think about it, you have a
day, let me know, it's just a suggestion and you

can-if there is even one person who doesn't like it
we won't do it, but it is a suggestion that other courts
have followed in long cases where jurors have sat
through a lot of testimony, and that is to let the
alternates go in but not participate, but just to sit in
on deliberations.
      -It's strictly a matter of courtesy and I know many
judges have done it with no objections from counsel.
One of the other things it does is if they don't partici-
pate but they're there, if an emergency comes up and
people decide they'd rather go with a new alternate
rather than 11, which the rules provide, it keeps that
option open.  It also keeps people from feeling they've
sat here for three months and then get just kind of
kicked out.  But it's certainly not worth-unless it's
something you all agree to, it's not worth your spend-
ing time hassling about, you know what I mean?
You've got too much else on your mind.  I don't want
it to be a big issue; it's just a suggestion.  Think
about it and let me know.-  App. 79.
  The matter arose again the next day, in an ambiguous
exchange between Gray's counsel and the District Court:
      -THE COURT: [H]ave you given any more thought
as to whether you want the alternates to go in and
not participate, or do you want them out?
      -MR. ROBISON [counsel for Gray]: We would ask
they not.
      -THE COURT: Not.-  App. 82.
One day later, on May 28, the last day of trial, the
District Court for a third time asked the defendants
whether they wanted the alternate jurors to retire into
the jury room.  Counsel for defendant Davy Hilling gave
an unequivocal, affirmative answer.
      -THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I received your
alternates. Do I understand that the defendants
now-it's hard to keep up with you, Counsel.  It's sort
of a day by day-but that's all right.  You do all
agree that all fourteen deliberate?
      -Okay.  Do you want me to instruct the two alter-
nates not to participate in deliberation?
      -MR. KELLOGG [counsel for Hilling]: That's what
I was on my feet to say.  It's my understanding that
the conversation was the two alternates go back there
instructed that they are not to take part in any
fashion in the deliberations.-  App. 86.
This discussion, like the preceding two, took place outside
the hearing of the jurors.  As before, both Gray's counsel
and Olano's counsel were present.  Gray, too, attended all
three discussions.  Olano may not have attended the
third-he claims that the marshal failed to return him to
the courtroom in time-but he was present at the first
two.
  The District Court concluded that Hilling's counsel was
speaking for the other defendants as well as his own
client.  None of the other counsel intervened during the
colloquy between the District Court and Hilling's counsel
on May 28, nor did anyone object later the same day
when the court instructed the jurors that the two alter-
nates would be permitted to attend deliberations.  The
court instructed:
-We have indicated to you that the parties would be
selecting alternates at this time.  I am going to
inform you who those alternates are, but before I do,
let me tell you, I think it was a difficult selection for
all concerned, and since the law requires that there
be a jury of twelve, it is only going to be a jury of
twelve.  But what we would like to do in this case is
have all of you go back so that even the alternates
can be there for the deliberations, but according to
the law, the alternates must not participate in the
deliberations.  It's going to be hard, but if you are an
alternate, we think you should be there because
things do happen in the course of lengthy jury delib-
erations, and if you need to step in, we want you to
be able to step in having heard the deliberations.
But we are going to ask that you not participate.
      -The alternates are Norman Sargent and Shirley
Kinsella.  I am going to ask at this time now, ladies
and gentlemen, that you retire to the jury room and
begin your deliberations.-  App. 89-90.
During deliberations, one of the alternate jurors was
excused at his request.  The other alternate remained
until the jury returned with its verdict.
  Both respondents were convicted on a number of
charges.  They appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  934 F. 2d 1425 (1991).
The Court of Appeals reversed certain counts for insuffi-
cient evidence and then considered whether the presence
of alternate jurors during jury deliberations violated Rule
24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
-The court may direct that not more than 6 jurors in
addition to the regular jury be called and impanelled
to sit as alternate jurors.  Alternate jurors in the
order in which they are called shall replace jurors
who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its
verdict, become or are found to be unable or disquali-
fied to perform their duties. . . .  An alternate juror
who does not replace a regular juror shall be dis-
charged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.-
Because respondents had not objected to the alternates'
presence, the court applied a -plain error- standard under
Rule 52(b).  Noting that -[w]e have not previously directly
resolved the question of the validity of a verdict when
alternate jurors are permitted to be present during the
jury's deliberations,- the court relied on the -language of
Rule 24(c), Rule 23(b), the Advisory Committee Notes to
Rule 23, and related Ninth Circuit precedent- to hold that
Rule 24(c) barred alternate jurors from attending jury
deliberations unless the defendant, on the record, explicitly
consented to their attendance.  934 F. 2d, at 1436-1437.
The court found that Rule 24(c) was violated in the
instant case, because -the district court did not obtain
individual waivers from each defendant personally, either
orally or in writing.-  Id., at 1438.  It then held that the
presence of alternates in violation of Rule 24(c) was
-inherently prejudicial- and reversible per se.  Ibid.
      -We cannot fairly ascertain whether in a given case
the alternate jurors followed the district court's
prohibition on participation.  However, even if they
heeded the letter of the court's instructions and
remained orally mute throughout, it is entirely possi-
ble that their attitudes, conveyed by facial expres-
sions, gestures or the like, may have had some effect
upon the decision of one or more jurors.-  Ibid.
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Finally, in a footnote, the court decided that -[b]ecause the
violation is inherently prejudicial and because it infringes
upon a substantial right of the defendants, it falls within
the plain error doctrine.-  Id., at 1439, n. 23.
  The Court of Appeals vacated respondents' remaining
convictions and did not reach the other -substantial
issues- that they had raised.  Id., at 1428, n. 3.  We
granted certiorari to clarify the standard for -plain error-
review by the Courts of Appeals under Rule 52(b).  504
U. S. ___ (1992).
                           II
  -No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court
than that a constitutional right,- or a right of any other
sort, -may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases
by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before
a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.-  Yakus v.
United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444 (1944).  Rule 52(b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs
on appeal from criminal proceedings, provides the Court
of Appeals a limited power to correct errors that were
forfeited because not timely raised in the District Court.
The Rule has remained unchanged since the original
version of the Criminal Rules, and was intended as -a
restatement of existing law.-  Advisory Committee's Notes
on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 833.
It is paired, appropriately, with Rule 52(a), which governs
nonforfeited errors.  Rule 52 provides:
      -(a) Harmless Error.  Any error, defect, irregulari-
ty or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded.
      -(b) Plain Error.  Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were
not brought to the attention of the court.-
  Although -[a] rigid and undeviating judicially declared
practice under which courts of review would invariably
and under all circumstances decline to consider all ques-
tions which had not previously been specifically urged
would be out of harmony with . . . the rules of fundamen-
tal justice,- Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, 557
(1941), the authority created by Rule 52(b) is circum-
scribed.  There must be an -error- that is -plain- and that
-affect[s] substantial rights.-  Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves
the decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound
discretion of the Court of Appeals, and the court should
not exercise that discretion unless the error -`seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.'-  United States v. Young, 470 U. S.
1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S.
157, 160 (1936)).
                            A
  Rule 52(b) defines a single category of forfeited-but-
reversible error.  Although it is possible to read the Rule
in the disjunctive, as creating two separate categories-
``plain errors'' and ``defects affecting substantial rights''-
that reading is surely wrong.  See Young, supra, at 15,
n. 12 (declining to adopt disjunctive reading).  As we
explained in Young, the phrase -error or defect- is more
simply read as -error.-  Ibid.  The forfeited error -may be
noticed- only if it is -plain- and -affect[s] substantial
rights.-  More precisely, the Court of Appeals may correct
the error (either vacating for a new trial, or reversing
outright) only if it meets these criteria.  The appellate
court must consider the error, putative or real, in deciding
whether the judgment below should be overturned, but
cannot provide that remedy unless Rule 52(b) applies (or
unless some other provision authorizes the error's correc-
tion, an issue that respondents do not raise).
  The first limitation on appellate authority under Rule
52(b) is that there indeed be an -error.-  Deviation from
a legal rule is -error- unless the rule has been waived.
For example, a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily
pleads guilty in conformity with the requirements of Rule
11 cannot have his conviction vacated by the Court of
Appeals on the grounds that he ought to have had a trial.
Because the right to trial is waivable, and because the
defendant who enters a valid guilty plea waives that
right, his conviction without a trial is not -error.-
  Waiver is different from forfeiture.  Whereas forfeiture
is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
waiver is the -intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right.-  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464
(1938); see, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. ___,
___, n. 2 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (distinguishing between -waiver-
and -forfeiture-); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural
Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473,
474-477 (1978) (same); Westen, Away from Waiver: A
Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214, 1214-1215
(1977) (same).  Whether a particular right is waivable;
whether the defendant must participate personally in the
waiver; whether certain procedures are required for
waiver; and whether the defendant's choice must be
particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right
at stake.  See, e.g., 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal
Procedure 11.6 (1984) (allocation of authority between
defendant and counsel); Dix, Waiver in Criminal Proce-
dure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 Texas L. Rev.
193 (1977) (waivability and standards for waiver).  Mere
forfeiture, as opposed to waiver, does not extinguish an
-error- under Rule 52(b).  Although in theory it could be
argued that -[i]f the question was not presented to the
trial court no error was committed by the trial court,
hence there is nothing to review,- Orfield, The Scope of
Appeal in Criminal Cases, 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 825, 840
(1936), this is not the theory that Rule 52(b) adopts.  If
a legal rule was violated during the District Court pro-
ceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule,
then there has been an -error- within the meaning of
Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection.
  The second limitation on appellate authority under Rule
52(b) is that the error be -plain.-  -Plain- is synonymous
with -clear- or, equivalently, -obvious.-  See Young, supra,
at 17, n. 14; United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 163
(1982).  We need not consider the special case where the
error was unclear at the time of trial but becomes clear
on appeal because the applicable law has been clarified.
At a minimum, the Court of Appeals cannot correct an
error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear
under current law.
  The third and final limitation on appellate authority
under Rule 52(b) is that the plain error -affec[t] substan-
tial rights.-  This is the same language employed in Rule
52(a), and in most cases it means that the error must
have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome
of the District Court proceedings.  See, e.g., Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States, 487 U. S. 250, 255-257 (1988);
United States v. Lane, 474 U. S. 438, 454-464 (1986)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 758-765 (1946).
When the defendant has made a timely objection to an
error and Rule 52(a) applies, the Court of Appeals nor-
mally engages in a specific analysis of the District Court
record-a so-called -harmless error- inquiry-to determine
whether the error was prejudicial.  Rule 52(b) normally
requires the same kind of inquiry, with one important
difference: It is the defendant rather than the Government
who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
prejudice.  In most cases, the Court of Appeals cannot
correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that
the error was prejudicial.  See Young, 470 U. S., at 17,
n. 14 (-[F]ederal courts have consistently interpreted the
plain-error doctrine as requiring an appellate court to find
that the claimed error . . . had [a] prejudicial impact on
the jury's deliberations-).  This burden-shifting is dictated
by a subtle but important difference in language between
the two parts of Rule 52: while Rule 52(a) precludes error-
correction only if the error -does not affect substantial
rights- (emphasis added), Rule 52(b) authorizes no remedy
unless the error does -affec[t] substantial rights.-  See also
Note, Appellate Review in a Criminal Case of Errors
Made Below Not Properly Raised and Reserved, 23 Miss.
L. J. 42, 57 (1951) (summarizing existing law) (-The error
must be real and such that it probably influenced the
verdict . . .-).
  We need not decide whether the phrase -affecting
substantial rights- is always synonymous with -prejudi-
cial.-  See generally Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U. S. ___,
___ (1991) (slip op., at 8) (constitutional error may not be
found harmless if error deprives defendant of the -`basic
protections [without which] a criminal trial cannot reliably
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt
or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regard-
ed as fundamentally fair'-) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478
U. S. 570, 577-578 (1986)).  There may be a special
category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regard-
less of their effect on the outcome, but this issue need not
be addressed.  Nor need we address those errors that
should be presumed prejudicial if the defendant cannot
make a specific showing of prejudice.  Normally, although
perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a
specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the -affecting
substantial rights- prong of Rule 52(b).

                            B
  Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory.  If the forfeited
error is -plain- and -affect[s] substantial rights,- the Court
of Appeals has authority to order correction, but is not
required to do so.  The language of the Rule (-may be
noticed-), the nature of forfeiture, and the established
appellate practice that Congress intended to continue, all
point to this conclusion.  -[I]n criminal cases, where the
life, or as in this case the liberty, of the defendant is at
stake, the courts of the United States, in the exercise of
a sound discretion, may notice [forfeited error].-  Sykes v.
United States, 204 F. 909, 913-914 (CA8 1913).  Accord,
Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183, 194 (1909);
former Supreme Court Rule 27.6 (1939) (cited in Advisory
Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. Rule 52(b),
p. 833) (``the court, at its option, may notice a plain error
not assigned or specified'').
  We previously have explained that the discretion con-
ferred by Rule 52(b) should be employed -`in those circum-
stances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result.'-  Young, supra, at 15 (quoting Frady, supra, at
163, n. 14)).  In our collateral-review jurisprudence, the
term -miscarriage of justice- means that the defendant is
actually innocent.  See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S.
___, ___-___ (1992) (slip op., at 4-6).  The Court of
Appeals should no doubt correct a plain forfeited error
that causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually
innocent defendant, see, e.g., Wiborg v. United States, 163
U. S. 632 (1896), but we have never held that a Rule
52(b) remedy is only warranted in cases of actual inno-
cence.
  Rather, the standard that should guide the exercise of
remedial discretion under Rule 52(b) was articulated in
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157 (1936).  The
Court of Appeals should correct a plain forfeited error
affecting substantial rights if the error -seriously affect[s]
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.-  Id., at 160.  As we explained in Young, the
-standard laid down in United States v. Atkinson [was]
codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b),- 470
U. S., at 7, and we repeatedly have quoted the Atkinson
language in describing plain-error review.  See id., at 15;
Frady, 456 U. S., at 163, n. 13; Silber v. United States,
370 U. S. 717, 718 (1962) (per curiam); Johnson v. United
States, 318 U. S. 189, 200 (1943); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 239 (1940); see also
Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 421, n. 19 (1977) (civil
appeal).  An error may -seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings-
independent of the defendant's innocence.  Conversely, a
plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without
more, satisfy the Atkinson standard, for otherwise the
discretion afforded by Rule 52(b) would be illusory.
  With these basic principles in mind, we turn to the
instant case.
                           III
  The presence of alternate jurors during jury delibera-
tions is no doubt a deviation from Rule 24(c).  The Rule
explicitly states: -An alternate juror who does not replace
a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires
to consider its verdict.-  It is a separate question whether
such deviation amounts to -error- when the defendant
consents to the alternates' presence.  The Government
supposes that there was indeed an -error- in this case, on
the premise that Rule 24(c) is nonwaivable, see Reply
Brief for United States 9, n. 4, and we assume without
deciding that this premise is correct.  The Government
also essentially concedes that the -error- was -plain.-  See
id., at 8-9, and n. 4.
  We therefore focus our attention on whether the error
-affect[ed] substantial rights- within the meaning of Rule
52(b), and conclude that it did not.  The presence of
alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind
of error that -affect[s] substantial rights- independent of
its prejudicial impact.  Nor have respondents made a
specific showing of prejudice.  Finally, we see no reason
to presume prejudice here.
  Assuming arguendo that certain errors -affec[t] substan-
tial rights- independent of prejudice, the instant violation
of Rule 24(c) is not such an error.  Although the presence
of alternate jurors does contravene -`the cardinal principle
that the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and
secret,'-  Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 23(b), 18 U. S. C. App., p. 785 (quoting United
States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F. 2d 868, 872 (CA4
1964)), the primary if not exclusive purpose of jury privacy
and secrecy is to protect the jury's deliberations from
improper influence.  -[I]f no harm resulted from this
intrusion [of an alternate juror into the jury room,]
reversal would be pointless.-  United States v. Watson, 669
F. 2d 1374, 1391 (CA11 1982).  We generally have ana-
lyzed outside intrusions upon the jury for prejudicial
impact.  See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U. S. 363
(1967) (per curiam) (bailiff's comments to jurors, such as
-Oh that wicked fellow he is guilty,- were prejudicial);
Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984) (pretrial publicity
was not prejudicial); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560
(1986) (presence of uniformed state troopers in courtroom
was not prejudicial).  A prime example is Remmer v.
United States, 347 U. S. 227 (1954), where an outsider
had communicated with a juror during a criminal trial,
appearing to offer a bribe, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation then had investigated the incident.  We
noted that -[t]he sending of an F. B. I. agent in the midst
of a trial to investigate a juror as to his conduct is bound
to impress the juror,- and remanded for the District Court
to -determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon
the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a
hearing with all interested parties permitted to partici-
pate.-  Id., at 229-230.
  This -intrusion- jurisprudence was summarized in Smith
v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209 (1982):
-[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time
a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising
situation.  Were that the rule, few trials would be
constitutionally acceptable. . . .  [I]t is virtually
impossible to shield jurors from every contact or
influence that might theoretically affect their vote.
Due process means a jury capable and willing to
decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and
a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occur-
rences when they happen.-  Id., at 217.
There may be cases where an intrusion should be pre-
sumed prejudicial, see, e.g., Patton, supra, at 1031-1035;
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466 (1965), but a presump-
tion of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not
change the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the
jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict?  We cannot
imagine why egregious comments by a bailiff to a juror
(Parker) or an apparent bribe followed by an official
investigation (Remmer) should be evaluated in terms of
-prejudice,- while the mere presence of alternate jurors
during jury deliberations should not.  Of course, the issue
here is whether the alternates' presence sufficed to
establish remedial authority under Rule 52(b), not whether
it violated the Sixth Amendment or Due Process Clause,
but we see no reason to depart from the normal interpre-
tation of the phrase -affecting substantial rights.-
  The question, then, is whether the instant violation of
Rule 24(c) prejudiced respondents, either specifically or
presumptively.  In theory, the presence of alternate jurors
during jury deliberations might prejudice a defendant in
two different ways: either because the alternates actually
participated in the deliberations, verbally or through -body
language-; or because the alternates' presence exerted a
-chilling- effect on the regular jurors.  See Watson, supra,
at 1391; United States v. Allison, 481 F. 2d 468, 472 (CA5
1973).  Conversely, -if the alternate in fact abided by the
court's instructions to remain orally silent and not to
otherwise indicate his views or attitude . . . and if the
presence of the alternate did not operate as a restraint
upon the regular jurors' freedom of expression and action,
we see little substantive difference between the presence
of [the alternate] and the presence in the juryroom of an
unexamined book which had not been admitted into
evidence.-  Id., at 472.
  Respondents have made no specific showing that the
alternate jurors in this case either participated in the
jury's deliberations or -chilled- deliberation by the regular
jurors.  We need not decide whether testimony on this
score by the alternate jurors or the regular jurors, through
affidavits or at a Remmer-like hearing, would violate Rule
606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, compare Watson,
supra, at 1391-1392, and n. 17, with United States v.
Beasley, 464 F. 2d 468 (CA10 1972), or whether the
Courts of Appeals have authority to remand for Remmer-
like hearings on plain-error review.  Respondents have
never requested a hearing, and thus the record before us
contains no direct evidence that the alternate jurors
influenced the verdict.  On this record, we are not per-
suaded that the instant violation of Rule 24(c) was
actually prejudicial.
  Nor will we presume prejudice for purposes of the Rule
52(b) analysis here.  The Court of Appeals was incorrect
in finding the error -inherently prejudicial.-  934 F. 2d,
at 1439.  Until the close of trial, the two alternate jurors
were indistinguishable from the twelve regular jurors.
Along with the regular jurors, they commenced their office
with an oath, see Tr. 212 (Mar. 2, 1987), received the
normal initial admonishment, see id., at 212-218, heard
the same evidence and arguments, and were not identified
as alternates until after the District Court gave a final set
of instructions, see App. 89-90.  In those instructions, the
District Court specifically enjoined the jurors that -accord-
ing to the law, the alternates must not participate in the
deliberations,- and reiterated, -we are going to ask that
you not participate.-  Ibid.  The Court of Appeals should
not have supposed that this injunction was contravened.
-[It is] the almost invariable assumption of the law that
jurors follow their instructions.-  Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U. S. 200, 206 (1987).  -[We] presum[e] that jurors,
conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the
particular language of the trial court's instructions in a
criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of,
and follow the instructions given them.-  Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 324, n. 9 (1985).  See also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (1984) (in
assessing prejudice for purposes of ineffective-assistance
claim, -a court should presume . . . that the judge or jury
acted according to law-).  Nor do we think that the mere
presence of alternate jurors entailed a sufficient risk of
-chill- to justify a presumption of prejudice on that score.
  In sum, respondents have not met their burden of
showing prejudice under Rule 52(b).  Whether the Govern-
ment could have met its burden of showing the absence
of prejudice, under Rule 52(a), if respondents had not
forfeited their claim of error, is not at issue here.  This
is a plain-error case, and it is respondents who must
persuade the appellate court that the deviation from Rule
24(c) was prejudicial.
  Because the conceded error in this case did not ``affec[t]
substantial rights,'' the Court of Appeals had no authority
to correct it.  We need not consider whether the error, if
prejudicial, would have warranted correction under the
Atkinson standard as ``seriously affect[ing] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.''  The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
                                            So ordered.